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Abstract 
 
Prior interviews conducted by the Software Industry Center with service providers in the Indian software 
industry suggested the need for some face-to-face communication in coordination-intensive activities. 
That is, despite improvements in communication capabilities due to information technology (IT), some IT 
services may still be inherently nontradable. This observation motivates the present paper. We examine 
the question of which services are tradable within a concrete setting: the outsourcing of IT services across 
a broad cross-section of establishments in the US. If markets for IT services are local, then we should 
expect the entry decisions of IT services firms will depend upon the size of the local market and 
conversely, increases in local supply should increase the likelihood of outsourcing by lowering cost of 
outsourcing. If markets are not local, then the composition of local demand should matter little to the 
entry decisions of suppliers, and local supply will not affect outsourcing.  We analyze outsourcing 
decisions from 52,191 establishments with over 100 employees at the end of 2002, for two types of IT 
services: programming and design and hosting. Programming and design projects require communication 
of detailed user requirements whereas hosting requires less coordination between client and service 
provider than programming and design.  Our empirical results bear out this intuition: Supply of 
programming and design services are more sensitive to increases in local market demand than are 
providers of hosting services, and the probability of outsourcing programming and design is increasing 
the local supply of outsourcing, but the outsourcing of hosting is not. This suggests that hosting services 
are more tradable than programming and design, and there is some irreducible non-tradable or “local” 
component to programming and design services.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 The outsourcing and offshoring of services in the US is an important and growing phenomenon 
that has recently attracted widespread attention.  Concerns have been expressed about a “hollowing out” 
of the American information technology sector, and about the potential loss of American technological 
leadership. Despite a recent increase in research on outsourcing and offshoring and extensive public 
discussion in this area, there remains relatively little understanding of which jobs are at risk to be 
outsourced or offshored. At present, widely varying projections of the number of jobs “at risk” have been 
presented, mostly by consulting firms (e.g., McCarthy 2002). Ultimately, these estimates turn on the 
question of which services are tradable.  
 There have been two prevailing views on which services are tradable. One view emphasizes the 
role of information technology in reducing the costs of performing services at a distance. Under this view, 
IT reduces the costs of coordinating economic activity over long distances. Proponents of this view argue 
that all services are potentially tradable (e.g., Roach 2005). A second view argues that humans work best 
in physical proximity to one another, and that face-to-face interaction is required for the execution of 
many types of services. Proponents of this view argue that offshoring is fraught with hidden costs arising 
from inexperienced personnel in the services company, differences in language and culture, and time 
differences between vendor and client site (Matloff 2005). Though a great deal of case study work has 
examined offshore project decisions and governance in a variety of situations  (e.g., Robinson and 
Kalakota 2004; Robinson et. al. 2005), this is ultimately a question not of what is possible but rather what 
is predominant.  
 In this paper, we examine the question of which services are tradable within a concrete setting: 
the outsourcing of IT services across a broad cross-section of firm in the US. We perform two separate 
sets of analyses. First, we begin by examining the cross-sectional variation in suppliers of IT services 
across the US. If markets for IT services are local, then we should expect the entry decisions of IT 
services firms will depend in part upon the size of the local market. Market size will depend both upon 
aggregate employment in downstream industries as well as the composition of firms in the local market 
and their propensity to purchase IT services. If markets are not local, then the composition of local 
demand should matter little to the entry decisions of suppliers. We examine the extent to which the local 
supply of IT services firms varies with the characteristics of demand in local markets. 
 Second, we examine the IT outsourcing decisions of a large cross-section of establishments in the 
US. We investigate the extent to which the outsourcing decision depends upon the local supply of 
outsourcing firms. Our major hypothesis is that if markets for IT services are local, then increases in local 
supply should increase the likelihood of outsourcing by lowering cost of outsourcing.  
We focus on the largest investors in IT in the United States. Specifically, we analyze a survey 
(conducted by Harte Hanks) of adoption of advanced Internet technologies at 52,191 establishments that 
have over 100 employees at the end of 2002. This sample consists of established firms rather than start-
ups. Approximately two-thirds of the U.S. workforce is employed in the type of establishments studied.  
 We examine the decisions of firms to outsourcing two types of IT services: programming and 
design and hosting. Programming and design refers to the decision to outsource programming tasks or 
planning and designing information systems that involve the integration of computer hardware, software, 
and communication technologies. These outsourcing projects by necessity require communication of 
detailed user requirements to be carried out successfully. Hosting involves management and operation of 
computer and data processing services for the client. After an initial set-up period, the requirements of 
such hosting services will be relatively static and will require less coordination between client and service 
provider than programming and design.   
 As a preview to our results, we show that: 
1. Supply of outsourcing services is greater, the greater is local market demand. In particular, 
outsourcing supply is increasing in local employment, the IT intensity of firms in the industry, 
and in other characteristics of local firms that make them more likely to outsource. However, 
providers of programming and design services are more sensitive to increases in local market 
demand than are providers of hosting services.   
2. On the demand side, the probability of outsourcing programming and design is increasing the 
local supply of outsourcing, but the outsourcing of hosting is not. This suggests that hosting 
services are more tradable than programming and design, and there is some irreducible non-
tradable or “local” component to programming and design services.  
3. The sensitivity to local conditions is greater in smaller markets: The decision to outsource is 
less sensitive at the margin to increases in local supply in large urban areas than in smaller 
areas.  
 
We view our research as building upon recent attempts to understand which services are tradable 
across a broad cross-section of the economy. Jensen and Kletzer (2005) examine which services are 
tradable by examining geographic concentration in economic activity. The idea there is that tradable 
industries will be geographically concentrated to take advantage of economies of scale and favorable 
location factors.  By contrast, non-tradable industries must locate where demand is and thus be 
geographically distributed similarly to economic activity in general.  Our approach is complementary: If a 
service is tradable, demand decisions will not be sensitive to whether the service is locally available (or 
the extent of its availability), and similarly, local supply will not depend on local demand.  Thus, we 
examine the determinants of local outsourcing supply and the micro-level determinants of outsourcing 
demand in a particular environment: IT outsourcing. Ono (2001) examines manufacturing firm decisions 
to outsource white-collar services such as advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, legal services, and 
software and data processing services. She examines how the outsourcing decision varies with potential 
demand as proxied by total population and a demand shifter. Like Ono (2001), we examine how the 
decision to outsource services depends upon local market conditions, however our analysis focuses on 
identifying which IT services are tradable and we focus on a broader cross-section of industries.  We also 
explicitly model local supply, and treat it as endogenous in the sense of potentially depending upon 
aggregate local demand. 
 
2. Geographic Variation in the Supply of Outsourcing Services 
We begin by examining the factors influencing the cross-sectional variation in the supply of 
providers of outsourcing services. Firms will continue to enter a local market until the expected profits 
from operating in that market are equal to zero. If the markets for IT outsourcing services are local, 
profitability depends upon local market size and thus, all else held constant, entry will be increasing in 
market size and will be decreasing in the costs of operating in the market. In contrast, if IT outsourcing is 
a tradable service, then the decision of where to locate will be based primarily on cost considerations.  
Our first test of whether IT outsourcing services are tradable examines the extent to which local 
supply is correlated with local demand shifters in a cross-section. We examine both the level of the 
coefficient estimates as well as changes in coefficient estimates across different outsourcing services that 
we expect ex ante to have varying sensitivity to local demand conditions. Later, we use these variables as 
instruments in our study of establishment-level outsourcing decisions.  
2.1 Data 
 
 Our data on local supply of outsourcing and on determinants of local demand (also referred to as 
demand shifters) is from 2001 County Business Patterns. Our baseline analysis examines establishment-
level supply at the county level. While it is common to examine county-level variation in the supply and 
concentration or industries, it is well known that use of county data is subject to measurement error 
because of the arbitrary nature of political boundaries.2 In our study, this problem manifests itself as 
mismeasurement in the geographic scope of markets. In future work, we will examine the robustness of 
our results to alternative market definitions.  
Next we discuss the dependent and independent variables in our supply side analysis. Descriptive 
statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1. For dependent variables, we examine the cross-
sectional variation in supply of two kinds of outsourcing services. First, we examine the log of 
programming and design establishments in the county. This is the total number of establishments in North 
                                                 
2 For an overview of recent work using alternate market definitions, see Holmes and Stevens (2003).  
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes 541511 and 541512.3 Programming and design 
services are those sets of services that involve writing software or designing information systems to meet 
the needs of clients. It requires vendors to solicit detailed user requirements from the client and involves 
repeated interaction between the vendor and client throughout the systems design and execution phase to 
successfully meet client needs (Kendall and Kendall 2004). Second, we examine the log of the total 
number of establishments involved in hosting services (NAICS 541513).4 After initial transfer of 
requirements of system hosting from client to vendor, we expect these services to require less vendor-
client interaction than programming and design.  
2.1.1 Independent Variables 
 We first examine how the supply of outsourcing establishments varies with local market size. Our 
model of outsourcing supply builds on Smith’s (1776) classic statement that “the division of labor is 
limited by the extent of the market.” Marshall (1920) and Stigler (1951) use Smith’s theorem to provide 
explanations for the localization of industry and, more broadly, urban agglomeration. As local industries 
expand, they encourage the growth of complementary subsidiary industries to serve parts of the 
production process. Similarly, the growth of local markets encourages the growth of “general specialties” 
that service multiple industries such as transportation infrastructure and professional non-tradable inputs 
such as IT services firms. We use the log of county employment from CBP to measure the aggregate 
potential market size in the county. When calculating county employment—as in all of the independent 
                                                 
3 According to the Census bureau, NAICS code 541511 “comprises establishments primarily engaged in writing, 
modifying, testing, and supporting software to meet the needs of a particular customer.” NAICS code 541512 
“comprises establishments primarily engaged in planning and designing computer systems that integrate computer 
hardware, software, and communication technologies.” 
4 NAICS 541513 “comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing on-site management and operation of 
clients' computer systems and/or data processing facilities.” NAICS 541513  includes “on site” hosting, which may 
have some sensitivity to local supply conditions. We had some robustness checks using instead NAICS 514210, 
which comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing electronic data processing services. These 
establishments may provide complete processing and preparation of reports from data supplied by customers; 
specialized services, such as automated data entry services; or may make data processing resources available to 
clients on an hourly or timesharing basis. This variable is somewhat problematic as well, as it comprises services 
that are outside of what we are considering “hosting.” The results are similar to those reported here.  The upshot of 
this discussion is that our measure for hosting is imperfect.  
variables in this section—we exclude establishments in the three-digit NAICS industry 541 (Professional, 
Scientific, and Technical Services).5  
 As is well known, industries differ substantially both in the extent of their IT use and in their 
geographic dispersion. Since IT-intensive firms may have a greater need for IT outsourcing services, 
locations with a higher percentage of IT-intensive firms will have greater average demand for IT 
outsourcing services. We use three sets of measures to capture differences in the IT intensity of firms 
across counties in our sample.6  
 The IT-intensity index captures how differences in industry mix will affect the demand for 
outsourcing. It is calculated by first identifying each industry’s use of IT services as a fraction of total 
inputs using BEA Input-Output Benchmark Tables for 1997.7 To calculate IT intensity for county l, these 
fractions are weighted by industry employment. Thus, for each county l and industry k, 
(industry  spending on IT services) (total county  employment in industry )
(total industry  spending on inputs) (total county  employment)l m
m lIT INTENSITY
m l
− =∑ m
and Real Estate (NAICS 521-525); Information Processing (NAICS 511-514 and 551); and Other 
Services (NAICS 561-814).8  
                                                
 
Next we control for the percentage of establishments in the county that are in industries that are 
involved in the production of IT. We follow the classification developed by the Department of Commerce 
as described by Cooke (2003), which has been used by prior authors (e.g. Daveri and Moscotto, 2002; 
Nordhaus, 2001).  
Last, we control for the percentage of establishments in different industry groupings: 
Manufacturing (NAICS 321-339); Wholesale and Retail Trade (NAICS 421-454); Finance, Insurance, 
 
5 NAICS 541 includes 541511-541513 plus the “other category” 541519. We exclude the entire three-digit category 
because in our calculation of IT-intensity it was impossible for us to identify the relevant six-digit industry in the 
s. 
farb, and Greenstein (2005) show that IT-intensive industries are concentrated in urban 
), Utilities (221), and Construction (233-235, and Transportation 
BEA input-output tables.  
6 Previous authors have also found that large counties and MSAs will have a higher percentage of IT-intensive firm
For example, Forman, Gold
areas. These additional measures will also help us to separate the market scale effect from the effects of increasing 
IT intensity that are correlated with market scale.  
7 IT services are identified using IO code 5415, computer systems design and related services.  
8 The excluded category includes Mining (211-213
and Warehousing (481-493). 
We next examine how the size of establishments in a location affects the entry of suppliers
noted above, the Smith-Marsh
. As 
all-Stigler theorem argues that increasing local market size will lead to 
greater  
et 
nt 
vertical disintegration. However, the intensity of vertical disintegration will depend on the source
of market growth. As noted by earlier studies (e.g., Ang and Staub 1998), large firms may achieve 
economies of scale without the use of IT services firms. If market growth arises primarily as a result of 
increases in the size of large firms, then entry by IT services firms will be limited. If, however, mark
growth arises through increasing numbers of small firms who are individually unable to achieve sufficie
market scale, then entry by IT services firms will greater. This idea was formalized by Bresnahan and 
Gambardella (1998). Thus, controlling for market size, the supply of IT services firms will decrease as the 
size of establishments increase relative to the industry average. To measure how variation in the 
establishment size distribution affects industry employment, we construct the following index of 
establishment size: 
 
(total employment in county  and industry m)
(total county (total establishments in county  and industry m)
(total employment in industry  in US)
(total establishments in industry  in US)
l
m
l
llTSIZE m
m
=∑ES employment in industry )(total county  employment) ml
, 
The first term in the index measures the size of county-industry establishments relative to the average size 
 similar establishments in the same industry across the US. It controls for the fact that average 
ross the 
Entry of outsourcing firms may also be influenced by cost differences across locations. One thing 
that may influence the costs of outsourcing firms may be the availability of highly skilled workers. To 
                                                
of
establishment size varies across industries. Values of the index past 1 indicate that the average size of 
establishments in the industry-county is smaller relative to establishments in the same industry ac
US. The second term then weights this county-industry index by the fraction of employment from that 
industry in the county.9  
 
d. Our results are robust to these alternate measures of the size distribution of firms.  
9 We have also examined alternative measures of establishment size, for example the percentage of establishments 
that exceed some size threshol
proxy for this, we also include the log of total enrollment from post-secondary colleges and universities
the county, obtain from B
 in 
arron’s.  
2.2 Res
n (1)-(3) are estimated over all counties in the US, while columns (4) 
re estimated over the set of counties for which we have demand information. As the 
qualitati
ults 
To estimate how these potential demand and cost shifters influence outsourcing supply, we 
estimate the following regression using ordinary least squares. Coefficient estimates and robust standard 
errors are reported in table 2. Colum
through (6) a
ve results are similar, we focus our discussion on the results in columns (1) through (3).  
0 1 2
3 4
log( ) log( )
log( ) ( )
β β β
β β
β γ ε
− = + − + − +
5
− + − +
− + − +∑
l l l
l l
i
l i l l
LOCAL SUPPLY CNTY EMPLOYMENT IT INTENSITY
ESTABLISHMENT SIZE PCT ITPRODUCING
UNIV ENROLL PCT IND i
Increases in population and potential demand significantly increase the supply of program
  
ming 
and design services to a region. Column 2 shows that elasticity of programming/design supply with 
respect to population is 0.806. This supports the conclusion that local market factors have a significant 
effect on the entry decisions of programming and design firms. It provides evidence to support the view 
that ver
 
 operating costs. For example, large counties may have better local IT and communications 
infrastru
 
which suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the establishment size index will decrease the 
tical specialization is increasing in the scale of the market (Stigler 1951), at least for this set of 
services.   
As expected, the sensitivity of hosting to local demand is weaker than that of 
programming/design; the elasticity of hosting supply with respect to population is 0.1899. However, it is 
still significant. This may be because locations with larger population and larger potential demand may
have lower
cture, which may lower the costs of hosting.  
 Table 2 also shows that entry of programming and design firms will be decreasing in average firm
size, other things equal. The coefficient estimate for the establishment size index in column 2 is -0.012, 
expected number of programming and design firms by 8.2%. Column 3 suggests that changes in average 
establishment size have little effect on the entry decisions of hosting firms; the coefficient estimate of -
0.0013 is not statistically significant.  
 As expected, entry of IT services firms will be increasing in the intensity with which firms use IT 
as well as increasing in the percentage of firms involved in the production of IT. However, once again th
supply of programming and design services is more sensitive than the supply of hosting to increases in 
local IT intensity. The coefficient estimate of the IT intensity index is 57.688 for programming and design
(column 2) and 35.106 for hosting, while the coefficient estimate for percent IT producing industries is 
2.852 for programming and design and
e 
 
 1.061 for hosting.  
e 
differences that may be correlated with the 
upply o ing 
ce 
ision, 
 Surprisingly, entry of both programming and design and hosting firms is decreasing in local 
university enrollment. It is likely that the variable is picking up unobservable cross-sectional factors that 
are negatively correlated with the supply of IT services. 
 Overall, these results suggest that the supply of programming and design services is more 
sensitive to local market conditions than is the supply of hosting services. However, as noted above, thes
results may also be capturing unobservable cross-sectional 
s f outsourcing. To say something more conclusive, we need a more explicit model characteriz
the demand for outsourcing services. We turn to this analysis in the next section.  
3. Theory and Hypotheses for the Decision to Outsour
 To understand how the local supply of outsourcing firms influences the IT outsourcing dec
we build a simple model of an establishment’s decision to staff IT projects with internal or external IT 
staff. Establishments face the following maximization problem: 
 1 2 1 1 2 2,max ( , , )1 2
π − −
x x
x x z w x w x  
where x1 and x2 represent the decision to hire external or internal IT employees (respectively), and w1 and 
al or internal worker. The functionw2 represent the wage of hiring and additional internal extern  ( )π ⋅  
represents the value of IT projects and the vector z represent establishment-specific and industry-specific 
variables that will shift the value of new IT projects. To decide upon the optimal level of outsourcing and 
IT employment, we take first order conditions: 
1 2
1
1 2
2
( , , ) 0
( , , ) 0
d x x z w
d x x z w
dx
1
2
dx
π
π
− =
− =
 
leading to the following optimal levels of outsourcing and internal IT employment: 
1 1 2
2 2 1
( , , )
( , , )
x f w x z
x f w x z
=
=  
The focus of our analysis will be on the optimal level of outsourcing x1. To econometrically estimate the 
outsourcing decision embedded in these first order conditions, we must make a number of additional 
employees will be a function of local supply
assumptions. First, we assume that if outsourcing markets are local, then the price of outsourcing 
, 1 ( )w g os η= + . Further, as noted below, we do not observe 
the true quantity of employees outsourced, only a binary variable indicating whether outsourcing had 
been used. Thus, the number of outsourcing employees hired will be a latent variable *1x . Further, the 
decision to outsource will also be a function of unobservables ν that are not captured in the vector
the decision we observe for establishment i wi
*
1 2( , , , )i i i i i ix f os x z
 z. Thus, 
ll be  
η ν= + . 
Assuming that *1ix  is linear in parameters gives us 
 *x os x z1 2i i i i i iα β γ η ν= + + + +  (1) 
If we assume that i iη ν+  is iid normal, then equation (1) is a probit model. Our major interest is in testing 
whether 0α > , that is, whether the decision to outsource is increasing in local supply.  
sion, one may be concerned that  may be correlated 
ith unobserved location-specific factors 
ios Of course, as (1) is a cross-sectional regres
iη  that increase the likelih
 p
ood of outsourcing. For example, w
outsourcing firms may refer to locate in places with a more highly skilled workforce, which may also 
lower the costs of outsourcing. In this case, estimates of α will be inconsistent. Further, 2x  may be 
correlated with unobservables that increase the value of outsourcing at an establishment. For example, 
management at the establishment may have a propensity for investing in IT that is inadequately control
for in the vector iz . To address this issue, we use nonlinear instrumental variable (IV) techniques. 
Following Maddala (1983, p. 247–52), we used Amemiy Generalized Least Squares.
led 
a ents 
 
10 Our instrum
for ios  will be the variables used in our supply equation: log of county employment, IT intensity index,
index of average establishment size, log of university employment, percent IT-producing industries, as 
well as industry c ntrols. Our instruments for 2io x  will be equal to the change in 2 'ix  for establishments 
'i i≠  from other firms in other locations in which the firm has establishments. We describe these 
instruments in further detail below.   
4. Data 
The data we use for this part of the ana sis come from the Harte Hanks rket Intelligence CI
eafter CI database). The CI database contains establishment-level data on (1) 
establishment characteristics, such as num
ly Ma  
Technology database (her
ber of employees, industry and location; (2) use of technology 
h as computers, networking equipment, printers and other office equipment; 
and (3) use of outsourcing. 
l 
ed that decisions on 
ments in all. We use the 52,191 observations with complete data.  
                                                
hardware and software, suc
Harte Hanks collects this information to resell as a tool for the marketing 
divisions at technology companies. Interview teams survey establishments throughout the calendar year; 
our sample contains the most current information as of December 2002. 
We focus on establishments rather than firms as the unit of analysis because establishment-leve
data will enable us to more precisely measure the impact of changes in local supply on the costs of 
outsourcing. Moreover, most software investment decisions in our data are made at the establishment 
level.  For instance, 80% of the establishments that responded to the question stat
adoption of Internet technologies were made at the establishment rather than the firm level. Our sample 
from the CI database contains all commercial establishments with over 100 employees, 91,129 
establish
 
10 In the first stage, the endogenous variables are treated as a linear function of the instruments and the exogenous 
variables. The second stage probit uses the predicted values for the endogenous variables from the first stage.  
4.1 Identifying Decisions to Outsource 
Our endogenous variable will be x1i, the extent of outsourcing by establishment i. This variabl
x
e 
ctively.  
ange of services. Harte Hanks 
ourcing services that an establishment may use. We aggregate 
these 20
 
t we 
 the outsourcing of Internet/web servers; web site management; the provision of routers; 
and the 
de 
1i is latent. We observe only discrete choices: whether or not the establishment chooses to outsource a 
particular service or not, with the observed decision takes on a value of either one or zero, respe
Establishments in our sample can contract with outside firms for a r
tracks 20 separate binary measures of outs
 different outsourcing services into two categories that have similar production technologies. 
These two categories will comprise the endogenous variables for our baseline model. We explore other 
classification of outsourcing services for our robustness checks discussed later. 
The first endogenous variable measures an establishment’s decision to outsource programming or 
network design services. An establishment is considered to have outsourced programming and design if it
answers yes to outsourcing any of the following services: application design; contract programming; 
outsourced application development; package software implementation; or Internet/web application 
development. 
The second variable measures an establishment’s decision to outsource the hosting or 
maintenance of a firm’s hardware or network facilities to a third party. An establishment is considered to 
have outsourced hosting services if it answers yes to outsourcing any of the following services: LAN 
client/server; LAN network management; or LAN maintenance. One category of hosting services tha
have omitted is
provision of firewalls. There are two reasons for this omission. First, these services are often 
provided by Internet service providers (ISPs) as well as by dedicated hosting firms. However, prior work 
(Greenstein 2000) has shown that there is considerable heterogeneity in the extent to which ISPs provi
these additional services. Because we are unable to determine which services ISPs provide, including 
ISPs in our measure of supply would add noise to this measure. Moreover, the costs (to the client) of 
hosting Internet services at a collocation facility may be increasing in the distance of the collocation 
facility from the client. In particular, clients may need to visit the collocation facility if there is a security 
intrusion. In general, holding all else equal, the link between the quality of service provision and 
proximity to the client is ambiguous for hosting of Internet/web services. Because of this, we exclude i
from our analysis.  Including this increases the sensitivity to local conditions for both supply of such 
services and the decision to outsource, but not markedly so, and the substantial differences between 
programming and design and hosting remain. 
4.2 Independent Variables 
 Summary statistics on the independent variables are included in Table 5. As before, measures of
local supply and supply instruments are calculated from County Business Patterns data. All other 
variables are calculated using the CI database. 
We use two different measures of the c
t 
 
hange in internal IT services ( 2ix ), depending upon the 
e consider. Whenmeasure of outsourcing that w  1ix  measures outsourcing of programming and design, 
then 2ix  measures changes in the number of programmers at the establishment between 2000 and 2002.
11 
1ix  measures outsourcing of hosting services, then 2ixWhen  measures changes in the number of non-PC 
servers at the establishment between 2000 and 2002. 
As noted above, 2ix  is likely to be correlated with establishment-specific unobservables that 
influence the likelihood of outsourcing. As an instrument for changes in the number of programmers, we 
calculate the change in programmers in other firms in the same 2-digit NAICS industry in other locations 
elated with an establishment’s change in 
program  th .12 
that the firm has an establishment. The instruments pick up factor changes in industry specific demand 
(but not location specific demand)  and should be corr
mers but not with e propensity of the establishment to outsource, conditional on its industry
We instrument for changes in the number of servers using this variable plus changes in the number of 
servers in other firms in the same 2-digit NAICS industry in other locations that the firm has an 
                                                 
11 In fact, number of programmers is measured as a categorical variable with the following ranges: 1-4; 5-9; 10-24; 
25-49; 50-99; 100-249; 250-499; 500-999; and 1000 or more. We use the midpoint of each interval and then 
calculate the change between 2000 and 2002.  
nt 
12 In an OLS regression of change in programmers on this instrument and other exogenous variables in our baseline 
regression (not reported), this instrument had a coefficient estimate of -0.0658 and was significant at the one perce
level.  
establishment. We include both variables as instruments because the instrument using servers al
weak.
one is 
lishment 
iptive Statistics 
wo 
g and design and 
nd 2000. Outsourcing of programming and design rose from 
18.6% i
 
, 
d. 
n 
contrast hey 
ate 
statistics, they are suggestive that internal and contract programmers may be used as complements to one 
                                      
13  
We include as additional controls in our regressions three-digit NAICS dummies, the log of 
establishment employment, a dummy indicating that the establishment comes from a multi-estab
firm, the number of PCs per employee and the number of non-PCs per employee.  
4.3 Descr
Table 3a shows how outsourcing of programming and design and hosting has changed over t
year intervals from 1998-2004 within a sample of 26,708 establishments that have remained in the CI 
database for the entire sample period. Incidence of outsourcing of both programmin
hosting jumped sharply between 1998 a
n 1998 to 30.1% in 2000, while outsourcing of hosting rose from 8.2% in 1998 to 17.2% in 2000. 
Outsourcing of both programming and design and hosting subsequently declined, possibly reflecting an
overall decline in real IT spending. However, by 2004 outsourcing of programming retreated to 20.7%
close to its 1998 levels. In contrast, 2004 outsourcing of hosting was 14.7%, still well above its 1998 
levels. Though not fully representative of the US economy, these data suggest that while outsourcing of 
programming is not following any obvious trend, outsourcing of hosting services may be trending upwar
Table 3b shows how the propensity to outsource varies with the change in programmers at an 
establishment. This variable provides a crude measure of how outsourcing varies with internal 
employment flows. The table shows that outsourcing of programming and design services is greater whe
establishments add programmers (29.4%) then when establishments lose programmers (24.0%). In 
, outsourcing of hosting is greater when establishments lose programmers (17.1%) than when t
add programmers (13.7%). Though we are unable to draw formal conclusions from these aggreg
           
13 In an OLS regression of change in servers on these two instruments and other exogenous variables in our baseline 
regression (not reported), the programmers instrument had a coefficient estimate of -0.0521 and had a p-value of 
0.334. 
another, while hosting services may be used as a substitute to internal IT staff, at least at the establishment 
level.  
Table 4 shows how 2002 outsourcing varies by the size of geographic area. Average outsourcing 
of programming and design is clearly increasing in the size of a location, though the pattern for hosti
less clear. Outsourcing of programming and design increases from an average level of 24.2% in small 
MSAs and rural areas to 26.1% in medium and large MSAs, and these levels are significantly different 
from on
ng is 
e another at the 1% level. In contrast, outsourcing of hosting declines slightly from an average 
level of
s 
w 
ifferences, 
urce. We 
 (4) show the results of instrumenting for local supply but not for 
nternal programmers and servers; and columns (5) and (6) show the full specification with 
upply and changes in internal programmers and servers. All results are reported as 
margina
 15.61% in rural areas and small MSAs to 15.60% in medium and large MSAs: these levels are 
not statistically different from one other. Since Table 2 suggests that the supply of outsourcing 
establishments is increasing in location size, these results suggest that the decision to outsource 
programming and design is increasing in the local supply of outsourcing firms. However, as is well firm
located in urban and rural areas are systematically different in the way they use IT (Forman, Goldfarb, 
and Greenstein 2005) and so are likely to be different in their propensity to outsource IT. To identify ho
local supply influences the decision to outsource, we require a model that controls for industry d
establishment size, and any potential endogeneity between local supply and the decision to outso
turn to this model in the next section.  
5. Results  
5.1 Baseline Results 
Table 6 displays our baseline results for how local supply influences the outsourcing of 
programming and design services and hosting services. Columns (1) and (2) show probit results without 
instrumental variables; columns (3) and
changes in i
instruments for local s
l effects.  
The results show that increases in the local supply of programming and design establishments 
increases the likelihood of outsourcing those services, while increases in the local supply of hosting 
establishments does not increase the likelihood of outsourcing hosting. This is true regardless of the 
extent to which instrumental variables are used. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show that increases in the local 
supply of programming and design firms have a statistically significant impact (at the 1% level) on the 
decision
ly 
s are 
ing and 
ncrease in programmers and servers increases the probability of outsourcing programming and 
design a  
 
ign 
d Straub 1998; 
Loh and
t 
 
ely 
 to outsource those services. The results in column (5) imply that a one standard deviation 
increase in the log of local programming and design estasblishments increases the probability of 
outsourcing programming and design by 0.7 percentage points. In contrast, increases in the local supp
of hosting establishments has no statistically significant impact on the decision to outsource hosting 
services.  
While columns (1) and (2) suggest that increases in the number of programmers and server
significantly positively correlated (at the 1% level) with increases in the outsourcing of programm
design and hosting, these results are not robust to the use of instrumental variables. This may be due in 
part to the weakness of some of our instruments. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that a one standard 
deviation i
nd hosting by 0.9 percentage points and 2.1 percentage points respectively, however columns (5)
and (6) suggest these variables have no significant impact on the outsourcing decisions. 
Columns (5) and (6) also show the impact of other establishment-specific factors on the decision
to outsourcing. The positive coefficient on establishment employment in the programming and des
regression is somewhat surprising. One common reason for the advantages of IT outsourcing is that third 
party firms are able to obtain economies of scale that are not possible in smaller firms. Thus, the decision 
to outsource has previously shown to be negatively correlated with firm size (e.g. Ang an
 Venkatraman 1992). This result likely reflects a larger number of software projects in larger 
establishments. Other things equal, a larger number of software projects will increase the likelihood tha
one project will be outsourced. This will in turn increase the likelihood that we observe outsourcing in our
measurement framework.  
Columns (5) and (6) shows that establishments from multi-establishments firms are 9.7 
percentage points less likely to outsource programming and design and 1.1 percentage points more lik
to outsource hosting. Both results are significant at the 1% level. Since this variable may capture 
differences in the costs and benefits of outsourcing for larger firms, this variable may in part capture firm 
size effects. Moreover, when establishments are part of a larger multi-establishment firm, these results 
may ref  
: 
 programming and design, while again hosting supply has little affect on the 
ting. A one standard deviation in the programming and design employment 
increase
n 
 
ss 
es, 
n large urban 
areas th
lect firm-level choices of where to locate IT projects. In future work, we plan to more carefully
investigate this hypothesis. 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
Table 7 examines the robustness of our results. Columns (1) and (2) show the robustness of our 
results to the use of employment as our measure of local supply. The results are qualitatively unchanged
increases in programming and design employment have a statistically significant positive affect (at the 
1% level) on the adoption of
decision to outsource hos
s the likelihood of outsourcing by 0.7 percentage points, identical to our results in Table 6.  
Columns (3) and (4) examine the robustness of our results to alternative dependent variables. 
Column (3) examines the relationship between increases in programming establishments and the decisio
to outsource programming, while column (4) examines the decision to outsource both non-Internet and 
Internet hosting. As expected, the results are qualitatively similar, though the point estimate of local 
supply has a weaker effect on programming and design and a stronger effect on hosting.  
Table 8 examines how increases in local supply increase the likelihood of outsourcing in large
versus small locations. Prior research has demonstrated that the effect of the marginal entrant on a market 
on increasing competition and decreasing price is declining with number of entrants (Bresnahan and Rei
1991). If increases in local supply increase the likelihood of outsourcing primarily through lower pric
we should similarly expect the impact of the marginal entrant on outsourcing to be lower i
an in small areas. To explore this further, we interact our supply variable with a dummy if the 
establishment is in a medium or large urban area.14 Columns (5) and (6) show the results using a full set 
of instrumental variables. Column (5) suggests that increase in local supply will increase the probabilit
of outsourcing programming and design more in small areas than in large urban areas. The direct effect in
this model is statistically significant at the 1% level, while the interaction effect is significant at the 10% 
level. A one standard deviation increase in the log of number of establishments will increase the 
probability of outsourcing by 1.3 percentage points in small areas but will increase the probability by only
0.8 percentage points in medium and large MSAs. Column (6) shows that a similar pattern exists 
hosting services, though the statistical significance is lower. The direct effect is now significant at the 
10% level, while the interaction effect is not statistically significant. These coefficient estimates sugges
that a one standard deviation increase in hosting increases the probability of hosting by 1.2 percentage 
points in small areas but by only 0.3 percent in small areas. The reason for the relatively stronger hosting
results in small areas is in contrast to our other results, and requires further exploration.  
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the geographic variation in supply and the decisi
y 
 
 
with 
t 
 
on to outsource 
: programming and design and hosting. Differences in the characteristics 
of these
 
 IT use of local firms, 
and the 
itive to 
                                                
two types of outsourcing services
 services and the manner in which they are supplied has lead to substantial differences in their 
geographic dispersion and, in turn, the likelihood that they are potentially tradable. 
For one class of services, programming and design, entry decisions into local markets appear to
be influenced by the size of the potential market. Total employment, the intensity of
size of local establishments all influence the magnitude of local supply. Further, establishment 
decisions to outsource are significantly influenced by the magnitude of local supply. These results suggest 
that markets for programming and design are local, and so these services are not tradable. 
In contrast, both supply decisions and micro-level outsourcing decisions for hosting services are 
much less sensitive to the characteristics of the local market. Hosting services are less sens
 
14 We have also estimated the model using a spline for local supply that allows the impact of the marginal entrant to 
vary across different ranges of supply. The results are qualitatively similar. In future work, we plan to more carefully 
explore the potential nonlinearity of the relationship between local supply and the decision to outsource.  
variatio  
l 
 will 
 
conduct
nd 
er, 
tive tables suggest that 
establish
rried out by the firm itself or its foreign 
subsidia   
 
f 
t the use of 
ns in local demand created by shifts in employment and IT intensity, and are not affected at all by
differences in average establishment size across locations. Moreover, the decision to outsource loca
hosting services does not seem to be shifted by changes in local supply. These results suggest that 
markets for hosting services may be far more tradable for hosting than for programming and design. 
These results have implications for understanding how trends in outsourcing and offshoring
influence US employment growth. While some tasks in programming and design can undoubtedly be
ed at a distance, these results suggest that providers of such services must maintain some local 
presence. Moreover, our descriptive tables suggest that (unconditionally at least) use of programming a
design services is associated with more employment growth, at least at the establishment level. Moreov
there is no clear aggregate trend the fraction of firms outsourcing these services. 
In contrast, the results suggest that provision of hosting services can more easily be conducted at 
a distance and potentially performed in offshore locations. Moreover, our descrip
ments are substituting the hosting services of other companies for internal IT personnel. Last, the 
there appears to be a trend of increasing use of outsourced hosting over time. Thus, for these sets of 
services, our results suggest that outsourcing of hosting is clearly a greater concern for US employment 
growth than the outsourcing of programming and design.  
Our focus is on outsourcing rather than offshoring.  The two are related but distinct.  Offshoring 
implies that the activity takes place offshore, but may be ca
ries.  Outsourcing implies that the activity is carried out by another firm, be it nearby or offshore.
It is possible that there are subtle interactions between need for proximity and contracting across firm
boundaries so that the potential for offshoring may be greater than that that implied by our results for 
programming and design services.  Nonetheless, the fact is that for software development and 
maintenance, offshoring is typically through outsourcing to other vendors.  Further, the large number o
programmers stationed by such vendors near their customers (witness the ongoing uproar abou
H1-B visas by IT firms) supports our findings that there is a significant need for proximity in some 
(though not all) aspects of software design and development.  It is possible that this need may be satisfied 
by foreign programmers being moved to be close to the clients; the fact remains that the activity take
place locally.  The implications for immigration policy may be less clear; those for our understanding of 
the boundaries of the firm are not.  It is unlikely that the American technological leadership in software
design and innovation will face a serious challenge in the near future.  
Our paper presents a methodology for identifying tradable and non-tradable services that can be 
useful outside of an IT setting. Use of this method could be useful in id
s 
 
entifying which positions are most 
at risk f
 
e and how this changes over time. Future research 
could ex  
n 
or being moved to alternate locations. Moreover, this method could also be useful for identifying 
whether the set of positions at risk is changing over time, due to improvements in outsourcing practices, 
technological change in IT that may reduce the coordination costs associated with distance (Forman, 
Goldfarb, and Greenstein 2005), or some other reason. The major constraint of this methodology is that it
requires micro-data on firm usage of outsourcing.  
This paper raises several new questions for research.  First, as noted above more research is 
needed on understanding which services are tradabl
plore more carefully the link between outsourcing and labor demand at the firm level. Future
research could also do micro-level studies of outsourcing to determine, for example, what features of 
services increase or decrease their tradability. Moreover, future research could explore how the selectio
of governance mechanisms in outsourcing arrangements varies with supplier distance. In short, the 
outsourcing and offshoring of services is an important research area in need of future work.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Standard
Deviation 
    Minimum Maximum Number of
Obs 
Full Data Set      
Log of programming establishments (NAICS 541511) 0.938542 1.33912 0 7.213032 3185 
Log of programming & design establishments (NAICS 541511/2) 1.235442 1.519849 0 7.765145 3185 
Log of hosting establishments (NAICS 541513) 0.163525 0.488553 0 3.931826 3185 
Log of county employment 8.838296 1.732382 2.302585 15.16671 3185 
IT Intensity Index 0.005284 0.002559 0 0.086475 3185 
Establishment Size Index 2.586472 8.703245 0.462234 294.8487 3185 
Percent of Establishments > 500 Employees 0.003051 0.026824 0 1 3185 
Percent of Establishments in Manufacturing 0.208666 0.154059 0 0.956435 3185 
Percent of Establishments in Whlse/Retail Trade 0.228801 0.097454 0 1 3185 
Percent of Establishments in FIRE 0.061629 0.044081 0 0.666667 3185 
Percent of Establishments in Info Processing 0.03303 0.033375 0 0.647482 3185 
Percent of Establishments in Other Services 0.397618 0.135809 0 1 3185 
Percent of Establishments in IT-Producing Ind 0.027546 0.029937 0 0.470837 3185 
Used in Demand Regressions      
Log of programming establishments (NAICS 541511) 1.076381 1.397022 0 7.213032 2721 
Log of programming & design establishments (NAICS 541511/2) 1.413147 1.56859 0 7.765145 2721 
Log of hosting establishments (NAICS 541513) 0.187079 0.522206 0 3.931826 2721 
Log of county employment 9.214482 1.503095 3.496508 15.16671 2721 
IT Intensity Index 0.005079 0.002545 0 0.864747 2721 
Establishment Size Index 2.137497 2.647978 0.479924 36.02635 2721 
Percent of Establishments > 500 Employees 0.001967 0.002496 0 0.520833 2721 
Percent of Establishments in Manufacturing 0.22743 0.152093 0 0.9564347 2721 
Percent of Establishments in Whlse/Retail Trade 0.212703 0.06183 0.164159 1 2721 
Percent of Establishments in FIRE 0.054656 0.026524 0 0.3191489 2721 
Percent of Establishments in Info Processing 0.0323 0.027999 0 0.3490919 2721 
Percent of Establishments in Other Services 0.377173 0.109128 0.484581 1 2721 
Percent of Establishments in IT-Producing Ind 0.028058 0.0295 0 0.4708367 2721 
 
Table 2: Supply Regressions 
 All Counties Counties Used in Demand Analysis 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
  Programming
Programming 
& Design Hosting Programming
Programming & 
Design Hosting
log of total county employment 0.6918 0.8061 0.1899 0.7829 0.9078 0.2201 
 (0.0169)** (0.0179)** (0.0101)** (0.0155)** (0.0158)** (0.0110)**
IT Intensity Index  59.2426 57.6884 35.1057 41.2502 37.8881 28.9437
 (21.2208)**  (21.3369)** (14.0397)* (15.5397)** (15.0176)* (13.2989)*
Average est size relative to US -0.0086 -0.0117 -0.0013 0.0003 -0.0062 0.0050 
 (0.0025)**     (0.0032)** (0.0008) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0020)*
Pct Manufacturing emp     -0.7576 -0.8035 -0.1689 -0.8200 -0.9179 -0.1135
 (0.1317)** (0.1409)** (0.0620)** (0.1510)** (0.1640)** (0.0711) 
Pct Whsle + Retail trade emp 1.0526 1.1825 0.1900 0.3434 0.3469 -0.0234 
 (0.2026)**     (0.2219)** (0.0859)* (0.2919) (0.3243) (0.1321)
Pct FIRE emp 4.8840 4.9215 1.9030 7.1688 6.3302 3.4818 
  (0.4888)** (0.4991)** (0.2947)** (0.6195)** (0.6216)** (0.4706)**
Pct Info Prof and Mgmt emp 1.1658 0.9605 0.6870 2.2479 1.8916 1.3026 
 (0.6779)+   (0.6625) (0.4051)+ (0.7353)** (0.7231)** (0.4973)**
Pct Oth Services emp 0.3945 0.5172 0.0979 0.1249 0.2657 -0.0164 
 (0.1402)**     (0.1566)** (0.0599) (0.1647) (0.1782) (0.0776)
Log of university enrollment -0.0076 -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0237 -0.0240 -0.0089 
 (0.0048)   (0.0052) (0.0023)* (0.0045)** (0.0048)** (0.0024)**
Pct IT-producing industries 2.6715 2.8524 1.0608 2.8299 2.9955 1.1232 
 (0.6987)**      (0.6967)** (0.4132)* (0.7521)** (0.7419)** (0.4603)*
Constant   -6.0956 -6.8699 -1.8980 -6.7345 -7.4949 -2.1918
  (0.1994)** (0.2124)** (0.1157)** (0.2127)** (0.2265)** (0.1268)**
Observations 3184 3184 3184 2721 2721 2721 
R-squared       0.7499 0.7861 0.4781 0.7816 0.8122 0.5206
Ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
+significant at 90% confidence level. *significant at 95% confidence level. **significant at 99% confidence level.
Table 3a: Average Outsourcing by Year 
 
 Programming
Programming 
& Design 
Hosting 
Ex 
Internet 
15.05% 18.57% 8.15% 1998 
(0.22%) (0.24%) (0.17%) 
21.77% 30.08% 17.24% 2000 
(0.25%) (0.28%) (0.23%) 
19.25% 27.22% 17.91% 2002 
(0.24%) (0.27%) (0.23%) 
12.52% 20.73% 14.70% 2004 
(0.20%) (0.25%) (0.22%) 
Note: Sample includes only establishments that are in the sample for all four 
years. Number of observations=26,708. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Table 3b: Average Outsourcing by 
Employment Change in Programmers 
 
 Frequency Programming
Programming 
& Design 
Hosting 
Ex 
Internet 
6,236 15.47% 23.97% 17.08% Decline in 
Programmers  (0.46%) (0.54%) (0.48%) 
37,312 17.22% 24.19% 16.22% No Change 
 (0.20%) (0.22%) (0.19%) 
17,080 21.87% 29.44% 13.72% Increase in 
Programmers  (0.32%) (0.35%) (0.26%) 
 
Note: Calculations for 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. Difference between decline and increase is sig at 5% 
level for all three types. 
 
Table 4: Average Outsourcing by Size of Metropolitan Statistical Area 
 
 Programming
Programming 
& Design 
Hosting 
Ex 
Internet 
17.81% 24.30% 15.91% Rural Area  
(0.38%) (0.43%) (0.37%) 
17.87% 23.85% 15.04% Small MSA (< 250,000) 
(0.54%) (0.60%) (0.50%) 
18.48% 26.30% 16.41% Medium MSA (250,000 to 1 
million) (0.35%) (0.40%) (0.34%) 
18.54% 26.08% 15.31% Large MSA (> 1 million) 
(0.21%) (0.24%) (0.20%) 
Note: Calculations for 2002. Standard errors in parentheses. Difference between rural/small and 
medium/large is sig at 5% level for all three types.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Establishment Outsourcing Analysis 
 
 
Mean Standard
Deviation 
 Minimum Maximum Number 
of Obs 
      
Outsource Programming 0.185952 0.389071 0 1 52191
Outsource Programming & Design 0.260409 0.438862 0 1 52191
Outsourcing Hosting Ex Internet 0.163266 0.369612 0 1 52191
Log(Local Programming Establishments) 3.934071 2.124855 0 7.213032 52191
Log(Local Programming & Design 
Establishments) 4.5142 2.19376 7.7651450 52191
Log(Local Hosting Establishments) 1.423794 1.263924 0 3.931826 52191
Change in Programmers 0.837357 28.81435 -500 500 52191
Change in Servers 1.088138 70.45643 -10000 6000 52191
Change in Programmers Instrument 0.314018 5.764956 -346.655 250 52191
Change in Servers Instrument 0.242966 9.864905 -883.463 410.5 52191
Log of County Employment 12.03868 1.729237 3.496508 15.16671 52191
IT Intensity Index 0.007193 0.003516 0 0.086475 52191
Establishment Size Index 1.520034 1.246224 0.479992 36.02635 52191
Log University Enrollment 8.953789 3.53963 0 13.1765 52191
Percent of Establishments in Manufacturing 0.157896 0.107231 0 0.956435 52191
Percent of Establishments in Whlse/Retail Trade 0.183636 0.035955 0.016416 1 52191
Percent of Establishments in FIRE 0.071733 0.034512 0 0.319149 52191
Percent of Establishments in Info Processing 0.057296 0.030596 0 0.347092 52191
Percent of Establishments in Other Services 0.373022 0.067172 0.092736 1 52191
Percent of Establishments in IT-Producing 0.047099 0.033799 0 0.470837 52191
Log Establishment Employment 5.567426 0.808246 4.60517 12.76769 52191
Multi-Establishment Dummy 0.428963 0.494933 0 1 52191
PCs per Employee  0.529886 4.510383 0 1001.05 52191
Non PCS per Employee 0.009858 0.07051 0 8.033334 52191
 
 
Table 6: Analysis of Establishment Outsourcing Decision 
 
  No Instruments 
Instrument for Local 
Supply 
Instrument for Local 
Supply & Change in 
Programmers/Servers 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
Programming 
& Design Hosting 
Programming 
& Design Hosting 
Programming 
& Design Hosting 
0.0036    0.0034  0.0030  Log(Local Programming & Design 
Establishments) (0.0010)**      (0.0010)** (0.0011)**
 0.0007  0.0020  0.0021 Log(Local Hosting Establishments) 
      (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016)
0.0003     0.0051  Change in Programmers 
(0.0001)**      (0.0032)
 0.0003     0.0013Change in Servers 
     (0.0000)** (0.0017)
0.0318     0.0021 0.0325 0.0028 0.0264 0.0018Log Establishment Employment 
(0.0026)**      (0.0022) (0.0026)** (0.0022) (0.0045)** (0.0022)
-0.0986 0.0108   -0.0987 0.0107 -0.0970 0.0109Multi-Establishment Dummy 
(0.0041)**   (0.0036)** (0.0041)** (0.0036)** (0.0044)** (0.0036)**
0.0385 -0.0002   0.0396 -0.0001 0.0379 -0.0003PCs per Employee 
(0.0015)**      (0.0006) (0.0015)** (0.0005) (0.0015)** (0.0006)
0.0912 0.0731   0.0953 0.0847 0.0135 0.0408Non PCS per Employee 
(0.0245)**    (0.0226)** (0.0244)** (0.0230)** (0.0585) (0.0577)
Observations   52191 52191 52191 52191 52191 52191
Values represent marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include dummy variables for three-digits NAICS. 
+significant at 90% confidence level. 
*significant at 95% confidence level. 
**significant at 99% confidence level. 
Table 7: Robustness to Alternative Dependent Variables and Measures of Local Supply 
 
Uses Employment to 
Measure Local Supply 
Alternate Dependent 
Variables 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Programming 
& Design Hosting Programming
Hosting 
(Includes 
Internet) 
Local Supply Programming & 
Design 0.0024    
     (0.0009)**
Local Supply Programming     0.0016  
     (0.0009)+
Local Supply Hosting  0.0009  0.0033 
     (0.0008) (0.0021)
Change in Programmers 0.0048  0.0028  
 (0.0032)    (0.0027)
Change in Servers  0.0012  0.0026 
     (0.0017) (0.0022)
Log Establishment Employment 0.0267 0.0019 0.0149 0.0003 
 (0.0045)**    (0.0022) (0.0039)** (0.0030)
Multi-Establishment Dummy   -0.0972 0.0109 -0.0806 -0.0812
 (0.0044)**    (0.0036)** (0.0038)** (0.0047)**
PCs per Employee 0.0380 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 
 (0.0015)**    (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Non PCS per Employee 0.0173 0.0423 0.0569 0.0321 
 (0.0586)    (0.0575) (0.0497) (0.0766)
Observations     52191 52191 52191 52191
Values represent marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include dummy variables for three-digits NAICS. 
+significant at 90% confidence level. 
*significant at 95% confidence level. 
**significant at 99% confidence level. 
Table 8: Are Marginal Increases in Local Supply Less Important in Large Urban Areas? 
  No Instruments 
Instrument for Local 
Supply 
Instrument for Local 
Supply & Change in 
Programmers/Servers 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
Programming 
& Design Hosting 
Programming 
& Design Hosting 
Programming 
& Design Hosting 
0.0065    0.0069  0.0059  Log(Local Programming & Design 
Establishments) (0.0017)**      (0.0018)** (0.0020)**
-0.0024    -0.0027 -0.0024 Log(Local Programming & Design 
Establishments)*Large MSA Dummy (0.0011)*      (0.0012)* (0.0013)+
 0.0063  0.0115  0.0094 Log(Local Hosting Establishments) 
      (0.0035)+ (0.0051)* (0.0056)+
      -0.0055 -0.0092 -0.0070Log(Local Hosting Establishments)*Large 
MSA Dummy       (0.0032)+ (0.0045)* (0.0051)
0.0003     0.0059  Change in Programmers 
(0.0001)**      (0.0026)*
 0.0003     0.0017Change in Servers 
     (0.0000)** (0.0015)
0.0317     0.0021 0.0324 0.0028 0.0254 0.0017Log Establishment Employment 
(0.0026)**      (0.0022) (0.0026)** (0.0022) (0.0040)** (0.0023)
-0.0985 0.0108   -0.0986 0.0107 -0.0967 0.0110Multi-Establishment Dummy 
(0.0041)**   (0.0036)** (0.0041)** (0.0036)** (0.0045)** (0.0037)**
0.0384 -0.0002   0.0394 -0.0001 0.0377 -0.0003PCs per Employee 
(0.0015)**      (0.0006) (0.0015)** (0.0005) (0.0015)** (0.0006)
0.0906 0.0728    0.0945 0.0839 -0.0012 0.0262Non PCS per Employee 
(0.0245)**    (0.0227)** (0.0245)** (0.0232)** (0.0495) (0.0529)
Observations   52191 52191 52191 52191 52191 52191
 
 
 
 
